Supply Chain Attack
Supply Chain Attack = hack the supplier to reach the customer
A supply chain attack is an attack that compromises an upstream supplier, tool or component in order to reach, through it, every organization that uses it.
The entry point can be a booby-trapped software update, a tampered open source library, a build tool or a managed service provider. A few landmark cases:
- SolarWinds (2020): a compromised update distributed to thousands of customers, including government agencies;
- 3CX (2023): a booby-trapped telephony application, itself compromised through another third-party program;
- xz-utils (2024): a backdoor introduced after years of contributions by a malicious maintainer, discovered just before it spread widely.
Countermeasures combine dependency inventories (SBOM), signing and traceability of artifacts (Sigstore, SLSA), isolated builds and fewer third-party dependencies.
Why it matters when hiring
This risk concerns AppSec, Product Security and DevSecOps teams, but also anyone who owns a CI/CD pipeline. In interviews, ask how the candidate controls what goes into a build: version pinning, review of new dependencies, provenance of images. An answer limited to "we run a vulnerability scanner" shows a partial view of the topic.
